Federal Judiciary

My Story

In trying to publish my book, The Pitfall of Truth: Holy War, its Rationale and Folly, on the nature of ideological violence that existed throughout human history, and now manifests itself in Islamic terrorism, I discovered that government (i.e. its arm that it the Library of Congress) does not give the same speech rights to individuals which is grants to corporations; corporations have a whole lot more speech rights.

Seeing this as a clear-cut violation of my First Amendment free speech rights as establishing censorship, and of my Fifth amendment property rights as a glaring manifestation of "crony capitalism," I filed a lawsuit in the Court of Federal Claims demanding that individuals be given speech rights of corporations – a mirror image of the well-known Citizens United case that was filed years later to demand that corporations be given speech rights of individuals.

What happened next is described in the lawsuit I filed to demand removal of images of Lady Justice from federal courthouses because they deceptively show "due process of the law" as honest and rational, contrary to what it actually is. (The case was immediately, without any hearings, thrown out by Judge Lorna Shofield of the Southern District Court of New York as "frivolous" – though what is so "frivolous" about objecting to government's disingenuous and deceptive messaging which causes confusion that results, in essence, in violation of constitutionally-granted "due process of the law," and in demanding that the actually-used "due process of the law" be honestly described so as to avoid the confusion?)

In any event, here is my story, narrated in most exquisite legalese:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––x
Lev Tsitrin,
Plaintiff
- against - Civil Action No. 13-cv-5900
US Department of Justice,
Defendant.
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––x

COMPLAINT

Plaintiff, Lev Tsitrin [...] complaining of the Defendant, US Department of Justice [...], alleges upon personal knowledge and information and belief as follows:

2. That under the Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution, Plaintiff is guaranteed "due process of the law."

3. That Defendant placed various depictions of due process of the law in US Courthouses (including the courthouse of Southern District of New York, where much of the action which caused the present lawsuit occurred), in the form of statues or murals.

4. That those artifacts show due process of the law as a blindfolded figure holding in its hand a two-tray scale, the trays symbolizing parties' legal and factual argument, while the blindfold symbolizes impartiality of the judge evaluating those two sets of argument.

5. That led by suchlike depictions into believing that this was indeed the due process of the law to which Plaintiff was entitled by the Fifth amendment, he filed a lawsuit in the Court of Federal Claims (05-775C) that was assigned to Judge Lettow.

6. That the case disputed, on the First and Fifth amendment grounds, constitutionality of eligibility limitation for the Library of Congress' cataloging-in-publication program (CIP) which makes upcoming books visible to nation's libraries and book trade via placing them in a centralized, government-run catalog and providing them with subject matter keywords searchable by libraries and trade, by which the mainstream players in the nation's "marketplace of ideas" (and economic marketplace of book trade, which is the same) can find and order the newly-published book in their area of interest. Authors and publishers sponsored by the authors are ineligible for this service, making their books invisible in the mainstream marketplace and creating, from the First Amendment perspective, a climate of "prior restraint" and censorship via requiring another party's approval of the book as a prerequisite for its entry into the mainstream marketplace, and, from the perspective of the Fifth amendment, of "crony capitalism" resulting in taking of property.

7. That in its response, government did not provide any constitutional argument for legality of the program "in the interest of judicial economy," arguing instead that Judge Lettow had no First amendment jurisdiction to consider constitutional aspect of the case, and pretending that Plaintiff did not actually dispute constitutionality of the program, but illogically demanded participation in the program while acknowledging his ineligibility for it.

8. That Judge Lettow substituted government's argument (or, more accurately, non-argument) right in his decision with the constitutional argument of his own invention to the effect that CIP ineligibility rule is rational and does not constitute censorship, and ruled in favor of his own argument.

9. That the subsequently-published government study titled "CiP Poised for Change" completely disproved the entire Judge Lettow-supplied argument, admitting that the purpose of CIP ineligibility is censorship or "vetting" of books, and that there is no rational basis for the rule whatsoever. Additionally, it disproved facts introduced by Judge Lettow in his Fifth amendment analysis, namely that presence in the CIP program was merely accidental to the book's success (the study calls CIP "critical" to the exchange of information and ideas in America); that PCN, a number that the Library of Congress may assign to a book, is an alternative to CIP with its searchable keywords (the study shows that PCN does nothing whatsoever for the book, but is merely a way for the Library of Congress to get millions of dollars worth of books for free), and that the librarians object to author-published books (two thirds of them don't).

10. That in his decision, Judge Lettow defined the limitations of his First amendment jurisdiction as follows "...to the extent that Plaintiffs invoke the First Amendment as the basis for their claims, this court is without the jurisdiction to consider them. Alleged violations of the First Amendment can only be considered collaterally by this court when making a determination whether payment is due...".

11. That the First amendment was actually discussed in the decision not "when making a determination whether payment is due" but after that, when the case has already been decided, making any First amendment discussion irrelevant to the actual decision-making.

12. That based on the acknowledged deficiencies of Judge Lettow's First amendment jurisdiction, and because all facts in Judge Lettow's decision have been proven by the government itself to be false, Plaintiff went to the court of undisputed First amendment jurisdiction, the Eastern district court of New York, to argue unconstitutionality of the program on the First amendment grounds alone (case 08-CV-1842).

13. That in his decision, Judge Vitaliano substituted Plaintiff's key jurisdictional argument (which was based on Judge Lettow's acknowledgment of deficiencies in his court's First amendment jurisdiction as "Alleged violations of the First Amendment can only be considered collaterally by this court when making a determination whether payment is due..." cited by Plaintiff's lawyer twice) with that of Judge Vitaliano's own imagining, in which this crucial quote was missing entirely.

14. That in his decision, Judge Vitaliano substituted Plaintiff's factual argument (which consisted of litany of facts supplied in government's study which completely disproved Judge Lettow's fantasies) with that of his own imagining, in which there was just a single instance of discrepancy (that contrary to Judge Lettow's assertion, librarians do not object to author-published books) which he ruled to be insignificant.

15. That Plaintiff appealed the decision in the 2nd Circuit court (case 11-494), specifically pointing out to Judges Jacobs, Katzmann, and Livingston that prior decisions were based on brazen substitution of parties' argument with that invented by Judges Lettow and Vitaliano.

16. That 2nd Circuit court affirmed the Eastern district court's ruling.

17. That, bewildered at sheer Kafkaesque bizarreness of the above-described "proceedings," Plaintiff filed lawsuits in state courts against Judges Lettow, Vitaliano, Jacobs, Katzmann, and Livingston for using fraudulent procedure when substituting parties' actual argument with their own fantasies (and emphatically not for issuing a wrong decision, as government and judges subsequently attempted to re-define the complained-of action in their briefs and rulings.)

18. That government removed those cases to federal courts (Tsitrin v. Lettow to US District Court for the District of Columbia 2011-cv-02057; Tsitrin v. Vitaliano, to US Eastern District Court of New York 2011-cv-05589; Tsitrin v. Jacobs, Katzmann and Livingston, to US Southern District Court of New York 2012-cv-01411) so as to argue that those judges were protected from prosecution by federal and judicial immunity accorded to judicial actions.

19. That Plaintiff pointed out that the complained-of action of substitution of parties' argument with judges' own fantasies could not have possibly been judicial, since (1) it turned judges into parties to the case, and a party to a case cannot possibly adjudicate the case it is party to – hence, those judges could not have possibly acted in their judicial capacity at the time when they performed the complained-of substitution of parties' argument with their own, and as a result were clearly not entitled to immunity; (2) it contradicted court's own definition of judicial process as expressed in the form of publicly-displayed artifacts commissioned to explain to the public the legitimate judicial process, which consists of impartial evaluation of parties' argument, not of substitution of such argument with judges' own fantasies prior to evaluation; (3) it contradicted the definition of proper judging agreed-on conjointly by all branches of US government – executive, legislative and judiciary – rather than by judiciary alone while acting in circumstances of obvious conflict of interests, during confirmation hearing of future Chief Justice Roberts, when he defined the judicial process by stating that a judge should "call balls and strikes, not pitch or bat;" and (4) due to a simple reductio ad absurdum argument – an example of the action identical in nature to complained-of substitutionary action taken by judges which they themselves would hardly consider judicial in nature – that it would be a valid judicial action for the judge in George Zimmermann case to take home George Zimmermann's gun, declaring that George Zimmermann had been unarmed during his confrontation with Trayvon Martin, and to bring from home judge's own gun declaring it to be Trayvon Martin's, so as to present him as having been armed.

20. That Department of Justice's lawyers argued, citing prior cases, that judges are entitled to acting "corruptly or maliciously."

21. That, true to substitutionary mode of judging, judges in all those cases substituted Plaintiff's above-described argument with a "non-argument," as they never mentioned it (let alone analyzed it) in their rulings.

22. That the gist of their rulings is, that under due process of the law, substitution of argument prior to making a decision is "a classic exercise of the judicial function" (as per Judge Garaufis' ruling in Tsitrin v. Vitaliano); or, as per Judge Buchwald in Tsitrin v. Jacobs, Katzmann, and Livingston, judges are "not so tightly cabined" as to be unable to substitute a party's argument with its exact opposite; and US Court of Appeals for the DC circuit Judges Garland, Tatel and Brown, (case 12-5317, Tsitrin v. Lettow), ruled that it is "so clear" that, when a judge substitutes parties' argument with his own imaginings he acts in "judicial capacity," that any argument to the contrary needs not be considered, but can be dismissed with a "summary action."

23. That since, per Defendant and judges themselves, under due process of the law judges have the right to willfully and arbitrarily substitute, prior to decision-making, parties' argument with its exact opposite, or with fantasies of their own, as well as to act "maliciously or corruptly," Defendant's depictions of due process of the law as an impartial weighing of parties' argument constitutes blatant deception, given that actual, substitutionary judging neither operates on parties' argument, nor is impartial – since no one, including judges, can be impartial to one's own argument.

24. That therefore, Defendant deceived Plaintiff as to the nature of the due process of the law by the use of such deceptive images.

25. That Defendant's deception of Plaintiff regarding the actual nature of due process of the law caused Plaintiff to suffer acute psychological and emotional traumas for over eight years, repeated every time the actual procedure turned out to be the exact opposite of that pictured in the images of judicial process deceptively introduced by Defendant.

26. That Defendant's deception of Plaintiff regarding the actual nature of due process of the law caused Plaintiff direct financial losses, since the fees Plaintiff paid his attorney to prepare Plaintiff's argument were literally wasted given that, when the argument substituted by a judge was government's (as done by Judge Lettow), Plaintiff's attorney could not have possibly prepared an adequate rebuttal, since government's argument was present not in government's briefs to which Plaintiff replied, but in judge's decision and hence unknown until it was too late and the decision was issued, or, when the argument substituted by a judge was Plaintiff's (as done by Judge Vitaliano), Plaintiff's money was wasted because the argument for which he paid was simply discarded by the judge when he substituted it with its opposite.

27. That pursuant to jurisdiction of the present court, Plaintiff demands that all artifacts deceptively depicting due process of the law as an impartial, honest weighing of parties' argument be removed from all federal courthouses, and replaced with written statements on courthouses' portals and public halls that reflect the actual due process of the law, as sanctioned by judiciary, such as: "Judges have the right to be corrupt or malicious;" "Judges have the right to willfully and arbitrarily substitute parties' argument with judges' own imaginings;" "Judges have the right to substitute parties' argument with its exact opposite;" "Judges can act as parties to the case they are adjudicating."

28. That monetary damages to compensate Plaintiff's actual expenses, and compensation for his emotional and psychological pain due to Defendant's deception of Plaintiff with regard to the actual nature of due process of the law can only be awarded by the Court of Federal Claims (which has no jurisdiction over constitutional questions); hence, completion of the case in the present court will not constitute the end of Plaintiff's claims; Plaintiff will request monetary damages in a subsequent lawsuit in the Court of Federal Claims.

WHEREFORE Plaintiff respectfully requests that this court orders removal of all artifacts depicting due process of the law as impartial weighing of parties' argument from all federal courthouses, and replacing them with written statements reflecting the actual due process of the law as sanctioned by the judiciary (such as: "Judges have the right to be corrupt or malicious;" "Judges have the right to substitute parties' argument with judges' own imaginings;" "Judges have the right to substitute parties' argument with its exact opposite;" "Judges can act as parties to the case they are adjudicating"); the monetary compensation to be decided in a subsequent case at the Court of Federal Claims which alone has the requisite jurisdiction.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Signed this 21 day of August, 2013
Lev Tsitrin